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Crude Moves: Oil, Power, and Politics
in Niger 
Jannik Schritt and Nikolaus Schareika 
Abstract: In this article, we analyse the political and social process through 
which Niger has emerged as a new oil state since 2008. Instead of viewing 
the situation as a clear-cut resource-curse scenario, we see oil as an im-
portant, but by no means determining factor in the country’s current politi-
cal workings. Analysing the main features and narratives of the Nigerien 
political game in this time of incipient oil production, we first of all observe 
how various political actors, including the government, political parties, civil 
society, and wealthy businesspeople, transform oil into a political resource by 
developing particular notions, images, and meanings of it, including scenarios 
of a resource curse or resource blessing. We thus argue that in the formative 
moment of Niger becoming a new oil state, oil appears as an idiom within 
which Niger’s current political and social processes are framed.  
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, Africa has increasingly been drawn into a 
new scramble for untapped oil reserves.1 In this process, a number of 
African countries have become new oil-producing states. One of these 
countries is Niger, whose government signed a production-sharing 
agreement with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 
2008. Three years later, the country’s first oil refinery, in the southeastern 
city of Zinder, started production. 
Looking closely at the new African oil states raises the question of 
how oil becomes a source of social, political, and cultural transformation. 
Since the early 1990s, after the counter-intuitive empirical findings that 
many (but not all) states were worse off after years of oil production, the 
dominant narrative in economics and political science, as well as in me-
dia accounts, has been based on the concept of the “resource curse” 
(Auty 1993). Initially, the resource-curse thesis was used to explain why 
resource wealth may lead to economic decline. Later, it was taken up and 
extended as causal relations could be established between resource-rich 
but otherwise poor countries’ tendencies towards political centralisation 
(Ross 2001), corruption (Leite 1999), and increased incidents of war 
(Humphreys 2005). Taken together, the resource-curse thesis considers 
oil – or better, oil money – as the origin of structural changes within 
African societies and as a fundamental game changer of their politics. 
In questioning the dominant focus of resource-curse studies on 
money flows, some anthropologists have pointed to the importance of 
the production of meanings of oil, arguing that these significations are 
essential in constructing a new oil reality and therefore in understanding 
the social transformations triggered by oil. Behrends and Schareika 
(2010) have therefore suggested that “signification” as a concept marks a 
distinctively anthropological approach to the study of oil production. 
Starting from the tradition of symbolic interactionalism and pragmatism, 
we conceptualise significations as produced in, through, and for process-
es of political negotiation between actors with opposing economic inter-
ests and varying and potentially conflicting positions of power and de-
grees of socio-political knowledge. We therefore view significations of oil 
as a means of creating social and political order as well as influence. 
Finally, studying signification as practice, and hence a process, not only 
entails examining temporal aspects of resource making and resource 
claiming (Ferry and Limbert 2008); rather, significatory practices are also 
                                                 
1 The dramatic drop in oil prices in 2015 is a new situation generating a series of 
interesting research questions. These questions are beyond the scope of this article.   
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always coupled with tangible political manoeuvres that also need to be 
taken into account, such as mobilisation, co-optation, repression, and 
corruption.  
Moreover, influential economists and political scientists have started 
to argue that the resource curse can be overcome by mechanisms of 
good governance, particularly transparency and institution building 
(Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007). In this sense, a new paradigm has 
been emerging in political science and economics over the past decade in 
which “governance” has become the most important factor in explaining 
the occurrence of the resource curse, with “good governance” becoming 
the solution to turn the “curse” into a “blessing” (for a review, see Hein-
rich and Pleines [2012], who speak of “resource challenges”). As a result, 
the resource-curse thesis has been articulated all over the globe in policy 
measures such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) and Publish What You Pay (PWYP) (Weszkalnys 2011); as we 
will show, it has even trickled down into political rhetoric. 
Thus, whether and how oil-induced transformations take place de-
pends on the context of its production (Basedau 2005). In this sense, the 
distribution of oil revenues and the production of meanings of oil must 
be placed into pre-existing patterns of domination to understand both 
oil’s peculiarity and its particular transformative potential (Behrends, 
Reyna, and Schlee 2011). In this anthropological study, we focus on both 
how oil becomes embedded into an already established political arena 
and the significations it assumes within this arena. To do so, we adopt a 
political-anthropological approach primarily inspired by the Manchester 
School’s extended-case method (Evens and Handelman 2006). We con-
ducted an ethnography of events that followed the signing of the oil 
contract in 2008 and the inauguration of Niger’s first oil refinery in 2011 
and situated these events into a larger political and historical context. 
Using the concepts of signification and temporality as analytical 
lenses allows us to see the specificity of oil in the emerging oil state of 
Niger primarily as a new idiom for doing politics. By appropriating the 
symbolic field of oil for their agendas, political players link and express 
pre-existing political conflicts in the language of oil. Moreover, we use 
the formative moment of Niger entering oil production as a particularly 
rewarding occasion to study the political dynamics within a West African 
state.  
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We start our analysis2 by sketching the pre-oil situation in Niger. We 
then look at the coming of oil and its relation to political conflict, before 
focusing on the main features and discourses of the Nigerien political 
game as oil exploitation begins and grows. 
Pre-Oil Niger 
Due to its harsh environment and landlocked position, Niger has seen 
little oil-exploration activity (Augé 2011). The first oil explorations in 
Niger started as early as 1958 – while it was still a French colony – fol-
lowing the discovery of oil in neighbouring Algeria in 1956. Oil was first 
found in Niger by Texaco and Esso in 1975 in the Agadem oil block, 
located in the far east of the country. With the oil explorations and the 
first positive discoveries becoming known in political circles and at least 
amongst parts of the Nigerien population in the eastern region of Diffa, 
oil production was anticipated to start for over three decades before it 
actually did; it was in fact uranium, and not oil, that first took centre 
stage in postcolonial Niger. 
Niger’s political configuration is profoundly shaped by uranium 
production (Grégoire 2011). The presence of uranium had already been 
confirmed by 1956. The French considered Niger’s uranium of geo-
strategic importance, both for securing France’s energy supply and for its 
potential use in nuclear weapons. The French state forcefully intervened 
in Niger’s postcolonial transition (van Walraven 2013) and thereby fa-
voured western Nigerien belonging and Zarma people, who in turn con-
stituted the political elite of the country until the National Conference 
and the transition to democracy in 1991 (Ibrahim 1994).  
The introduction of a multiparty system gave rise to a decade of ex-
perimentation and repeated breakdowns in the institutional order (Vil-
lalón and Idrissa 2005). It also changed the rules of the game in terms of 
political competition, civil society activism, and media pluralism. A num-
ber of new political parties emerged. Over the coming years, the most 
important would be the newly founded ruling party Mouvement Natio-
nal pour une Société de Développement (National Movement for the 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to Andrea Behrends, Annika Witte, and the anonymous re-
viewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The research was 
funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft, DFG) as a subproject entitled “Significations of Oil and Social Change 
in Niger and Chad” within Priority Program 1448, “Adaptation and Creativity 
in Africa: Technologies and Significations in the Production of Order and Dis-
order.” We wish to thank the DFG for its support. 
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Development of Society, MNSD-Nassara), led by Mamadou Tandja; 
Mahamadou Issoufou’s Parti Nigerien pour la Démocratie et le Social-
isme (Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism, PNDS-Tarayya); and 
Mahamane Ousmane’s Convention Démocratique et Sociale (Democrat-
ic and Social Convention, CDS-Rahama). Moreover, since becoming 
legal and legitimate as counter-balances to state power at the National 
Conference, and driven largely by economic rather than political goals, 
civil society associations and labour unions have played an ambiguous 
role in regime change, contributing to both “autocratic” and “democrat-
ic” breakdowns (Elischer 2013). It was in this social and political constel-
lation that the oil project began in 2008. Indeed, long before the first 
barrel had been produced, oil was being put to use in political disputes. 
Crude Awakening: The Coming of Oil in Niger 
In June 2008, after 50 years of exploration, Niger signed a contract with 
CNPC to produce oil from the Agadem block and build a refinery near 
Zinder, to be connected by a 462.5 km pipeline (see Figure 1).3 
On signing the contract with CNPC, the Nigerien government re-
ceived a USD 300 million bonus payment. A few weeks later, on 27 
October 2008, the cornerstone ceremony for the oil refinery in Zinder 
was held. The same day marked the launch of a political campaign 
known as “Tazartché” or “Continuation!”4 Tazartché aimed to change 
the Constitution to allow President Mamadou Tandja a transition phase 
of three years prior to the new elections, to seek an unlimited number of 
terms as president, and to switch Niger from a semi-presidential to a 
presidential system.5 Upon his arrival in Zinder, thousands of supporters 
welcomed Tandja with the slogan “Tazartché.” The political mobilisation 
built on the justification that Tandja had opted for Zinder as the site of 
                                                 
3 The agreement involved oilfield exploration and development, a 20,000 bpd 
joint-venture refinery in Zinder, and the construction and operation of a 462.5 
km pipeline connecting the oilfields to the refinery. Since 2012, government 
revenues from the integrated oil project have been slightly more than USD 100 
million annually (approximately 5% of Niger’s GDP). Although Niger does not 
yet export crude oil (export of crude is not expected to start before 2019), an-
nual revenue from Nigerien oil production is already slightly higher than from 
uranium extraction by AREVA/France, which has made Niger the world’s 
fourth-largest uranium producer. 
4 The term “tazarce” comes from Hausa and is mostly written “Tazartché” in 
French. It roughly translates as “continuation.” 
5 Tandja’s presidency was set to end in 2009 after the maximum two mandates, 
as specified in the Nigerien Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
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the oil refinery, a region that had always felt marginalised by and dissatis-
fied with national politics in the capital, Niamey. Here we should re-
member that it was in Zinder that the CDS-Rahama, the coalition part-
ner of Tandja’s MNSD at the time, emerged as an eastern Nigerien 
response to western Nigerien and Zarma dominance (Lund 2001), retain-
ing its electoral stronghold here even today. 
Figure 1. Oil Production in Niger 
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on UN map no. 4234. The map first appeared 
in Schritt 2016. 
In his speech at the refinery’s foundation-stone ceremony, Zinder gov-
ernor Yahaya Yandaka asked the president, in the name of the Nigerien 
population, to complete the great construction sites that he had initiated, 
and especially those that had made Niger an oil producer. After its 
launch, supporters of the president organised pro-Tazartché demonstra-
tions, and Tandja’s political entourage used state television and radio 
stations across the country to propagate the need for a constitutional 
change. Three messages seem to have been strategically placed in the 
political campaign for constitutional change: first, that the Nigerien people 
wanted Tandja to remain in office, and the Constitution to therefore be 
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changed accordingly; second, that Tandja himself was ultimately respon-
sible for and intimately connected with the development of Nigerien oil 
(and uranium); and third, that a move to a presidential system would 
better fit Nigerien culture (Baudais and Chauzal 2011: 298). Throughout 
the campaign, Tandja was presented as “the father of oil production”; it 
was his “pragmatism” and “nationalism” that had facilitated Niger be-
coming an oil-producing country, and changing the president at this 
decisive moment in history would bring national instability and threaten 
the country’s oil (and uranium) projects.6 
In making use of the resource-curse scenario, long-time political ob-
servers of Niger have come to the conclusion that Tazartché was trig-
gered by oil (and uranium). After all, Tazartché was designed to alter the 
Constitution and get Tandja re-elected as president, thereby placing him 
in the best position to capture future oil (and uranium) rents (Grégoire 
2010, 2011: 222–223; Gazibo 2011: 342–343). But does this assumption 
withstand empirical scrutiny? A closer look at the emergence of oil and 
its relationship to political conflict in Niger undermines such analyses 
built on clear-cut causal links predicted by the resource-curse thesis. 
On 7 July 2005, the private Nigerien newspaper Le Temoin published 
the headline “Guerre souterraine entre Hama et Tandja,”7 reporting 
rumours that Tandja would opt for a third mandate.8 Conflicts had al-
ready arisen in 2004 between President Tandja and Prime Minister Hama 
Amadou, when the former announced his candidacy for a second man-
date. At the time, the Nigerien public perceived Amadou as the country’s 
real strongman, pulling the strings while Tandja, “the old man,” was 
executing only the office of the symbolic president. However, in an-
nouncing his second candidacy, Tandja showed his willingness to con-
tinue in office, and ultimately won the struggle for power against Ama-
dou within the MNSD-Nassara party. At the time of its conception, 
Tazartché predated the mining of oil in Niger. Although CNPC had 
been conducting oil-exploration activities in the Teneré and Bilma oil 
blocks since 2003, and Esso and PETRONAS in the Agadem oil block 
since 2002, the latter companies qualified Niger’s oil reserves as econom-
ically unprofitable (with estimations of reserves of only approximately 
                                                 
6 By entering into the oil contract with CNPC, Tandja’s “nationalism” refers to 
his anti-imperial and anti-neocolonial image of a strong leader able to resist 
Western interference that wanted to keep Niger’s oil as a future reserve. 
7 “Underground war between Hama and Tandja.” 
8 In a 2005 article, Keenan (2005: 406) also mentioned Tandja’s project to change 
the Constitution to extend his presidency beyond the maximum two terms. 
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350 million barrels at a time when the oil price was still around USD 
30/barrel). 
Nevertheless, Amadou remained prime minister after 2004 and 
looked set to stand for the presidency in 2009, when Tandja’s reign 
would end. However, rumours that Tandja would change the Constitu-
tion so he could stand for a third mandate fuelled conflict between the 
political camps. In December 2005 – shortly after the first rumours of 
Tazartché had spread – Amadou announced his candidacy for the 2009 
presidential elections. In doing so, he sought to show Tandja his deter-
mination to fight any attempt at constitutional change. When the embez-
zlement of international donor funds became public in 2006 in the so-
called “affaire MEBA”9 and the international donor community demand-
ed an explanation, Tandja used the opportunity to launch the anti-cor-
ruption campaign “opération mains propres,” in which he mainly targeted 
members of Amadou’s political camp. That same year, Esso and 
PETRONAS abandoned the Agadem oil block, refusing to build an oil 
refinery that the Tandja government had made a condition for signing an 
oil contract designed to diversify Niger’s resource sector. 
Amadou himself was finally removed from office in a no-confi-
dence vote in 2007 and was imprisoned along with some of his followers 
in June 2008.10 The same month, the Nigerien government finally con-
cluded the oil contract with CNPC, who had agreed on the terms set by 
the Tandja government (raising reserve estimations up to 744 million 
barrels of oil at a time when the oil price was around USD 147/barrel).11 
After his release, Amadou founded the Mouvement Démocratique Ni-
gérien pour une Fédération Africaine (Nigerien Democratic Movement 
for an African Federation, MODEN-FA Lumana) party in 2009. 
By eliminating his strongest political opponent within the party, 
Tandja regained wide-ranging power and was left virtually unopposed. 
To turn the strategically fabricated “will of the people” for him to con-
tinue as president into a public fact, Tandja bought off popular civil 
society associations and labour unions to participate in and lobby for 
Tazartché (Abdoul Azizou 2010). To secure their support, Tandja of-
fered seats in governmental bodies to some civil society activists who 
                                                 
9 MEBA stands for the Ministère de L’Éducation de Base et de l’Alphabétisation 
(Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy). 
10 We do not claim that Hama Amadou was innocent. Rather, we argue that he 
was a political victim, as corruption and embezzlement of public funds are part 
of the everyday political game (Olivier de Sardan 1999). 
11 At the time of writing in 2018, reserves were already estimated to be close to 4 
billion barrels of oil. 
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had supported Tazartché. To demonstrate the people’s will, the Tandja 
government organised a referendum on constitutional change for 4 Au-
gust 2009. While Tazartché won at the ballot box, members of the politi-
cal opposition and the international community claimed the ballot was 
rigged. 
In short, the Tazartché campaign was neither a spontaneous social 
movement, nor was it triggered by the oil contract with China. While 
Tazartché started well before the signing of the oil contract, the contract 
was nevertheless ideologically exploited for Tazartché’s realisation. Ni-
ger’s oil endeavour served to legitimise Tazartché, although Tazartché 
itself has to be seen as a political conflict. Whereas the USD 300 million 
bonus payment to the Nigerien state may have been important in fund-
ing and organising the campaign, Tazartché was more about securing 
political power than anticipating the future oil revenues as spoils. Argu-
ably, Tazartché can be taken as a key to understanding the current politi-
cal processes in Niger and the role oil plays in those processes. Let us 
therefore look at the political events following Tazartché to see how 
significations of oil were produced in and for political conflict in Niger. 
Crude Alliances: Reactions against Tazartché 
As it had done throughout the previous two decades of institutional 
breakdowns and regime transitions following the introduction of the 
multiparty system (Villalón and Idrissa 2005), the political elite firmly 
united against the attempt to centralise power. On 16 July 2009, CDS-
Rahama leader Mahamane Ousmane withdrew his party from the ruling 
coalition and joined with the political opposition as well as several labour 
unions and civil society associations who had formed the Coordination 
des Forces pour la Démocratie et la République (Coordination of Forces 
for Democracy and the Republic, CFDR), a “democracy movement.” 
The political opposition’s strategy was not so much to question Tandja’s 
image of pragmatism and nationalism, but to play the “democracy card” 
by calling Tazartché a “coup d’état constitutionnel” (CFDR 2009). They ac-
cused “Tandja and his clan” of violating constitutional democracy, fa-
vouring clientelism and corruption, and being involved in mafia-like 
practices and drug trafficking in the Sahara. 
The opposition organised pro-democracy demonstrations to ad-
dress the international community and to call for sanctions against the 
Nigerien state. The call for democracy seems to have evoked the idea of 
the “resource curse” to shape public sentiment: As Niger now had oil, 
the country was on the road to dictatorship! National political observers 
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in Nigerien newspapers quickly established a relationship between Niger 
developing oil production and Tazartché, as did some academic obser-
vers (Gazibo 2011; Grégoire 2011, 2010). The opposition forces suc-
ceeded with their call, with international sanctions against the Tandja 
government enacted after the 2009 constitutional referendum.  
Tazartché was backed by then Libyan president Muammar al-
Qaddafi, who declared it time to ban restrictions on presidential terms 
from all African constitutions and to let the will of the people decide 
how long the president could remain in office. Indeed, it is important to 
note that leaders in a number of both resource-rich and resource-poor 
African countries including Senegal (2012), Burkina Faso (2014), Congo-
Brazzaville (2015), and Burundi (2015) have attempted to push through 
such constitutional changes in recent years. Given that, drawing hasty 
conclusions from the resource-curse thesis should be avoided. 
Indicating that he was determined to stay in power with the help of 
China, Tandja reacted to the sanctions with a nationalist discourse, stat-
ing that he had “two strings to his bow, if one should break, there is 
always the other” (Grégoire 2010). In a speech in Diffa, Tandja attacked 
the political opposition for committing “treason” against their “own 
brothers” (his government) and collaborating with “the enemy” (the 
West). We argue, therefore, that while Tandja’s primary goal was to se-
cure political power, the USD 300 million bonus payment and the new 
partnership with China may have provided invaluable financial and ideo-
logical resources for the production of meanings and for the acquisition 
of supporters that were essential for the success of Tazartché, especially 
in light of international sanctions and powerful internal opposition. 
On 18 February 2010 Tandja was overthrown in a military coup led 
by Commander Salou Djibo. This was nearly two years before the first 
barrel of oil had been produced. Djibo’s stated aim was to turn Niger 
into an example of democracy and good governance. Leading civil socie-
ty activists who had supported the opposition in their fight against con-
stitutional change were appointed to prominent positions in the National 
Consultative Council by the transitional government (Maccatory, Ouma-
rou, and Poncelet 2010: 355). Less than one year after seizing power, 
Djibo organised new elections, which saw the former opposition party 
PNDS-Tarayya come to power, with party leader Mahamadou Issoufou 
becoming president in 2011. Issoufou built a coalition with MODEN-FA 
Lumana, the party of former prime minister Hama Amadou, who was 
appointed president of Parliament. The former government majority 
under Tandja, the CDS and MNSD, found itself forming the new polit-
ical opposition. With the coming of the new government, the civil socie-
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ty associations within the governmental bodies that had supported 
Tazartché were removed and replaced by civil society associations that 
had been members of the CFDR. 
One of the first aims of the Issoufou government was to re-
establish the old economic partnerships with Western donors (such as 
with the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and the World 
Bank) that had been suspended under Tandja, in addition to creating 
new ones. Oil played a prominent role in this task. In his inaugural 
speech, Issoufou addressed the international community, declaring his 
commitment to overcoming the “resource curse” with mechanisms of 
good governance and promising to use the oil revenues to improve state 
services such as the provision of schools, health centres, and water sup-
ply. To illustrate his commitment to transparency and good governance, 
Issoufou soon created anti-corruption institutions such as the anti-cor-
ruption hotline ligne verte; the Bureau Informations-Réclamations, Lutte 
contre la Corruption et le Trafic d’Influence (Information and Reclama-
tion Office, Fight against Corruption and Influence Peddling), responsi-
ble for fighting corruption in the legal system; and the Haute Autorité de 
Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées (High Authority 
for the Fight Against Corruption and Related Offences, HALCIA), 
whose mandate was to fight corruption in the public sector. And, indeed, 
shortly after Issoufou came to power, many Western donors resumed 
their suspended economic partnerships with Niger, or created new ones.  
Moreover, the hope to overcome the resource curse and to turn it 
into a blessing with good governance was taken up by civil society asso-
ciations engaging in the public debate of the extractive industries in Ni-
ger. Having been harsh critics of Tazartché and the Tandja government 
before, the Réseau des Organisations pour la Transparence et l’Analyse 
Budgétaire (Network of Organisations for Transparency and Budget 
Analysis, ROTAB), a member of the international transparency networks 
PWYP and EITI, and the Groupe de Réflexion et d’action sur les indus-
tries Extractives du Niger (Group for Reflection and Action on the Ex-
tractive Industries of Niger, GREN), also a member of EITI, explicitly 
drew on the resource-curse scenario in press conferences, publications, 
and interviews, arguing that the task of civil society should be to prime 
the population to see oil production as a blessing. In May 2011 one of 
the authors was walking alongside Salissou Oubandoma – former na-
tional coordinator of GREN who was appointed vice president of 
HALCIA under the new government of Issoufou – through the sandy 
streets of cité fayçal in Niamey, when we passed a group of elderly politi-
cians from the Tandja regime who were enjoying shade and tea in front 
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of a house. They first greeted Oubandoma, but then immediately 
stressed with a mixture of amazement and complaint that he had become 
mute in public after having previously been a harsh critic. The same was 
said of Ali Idrissa, national coordinator of ROTAB, who is publicly 
known to have close ties with the Lumana party of Hama Amadou, 
which was part of the Issoufou government from 2011 to 2013.12 
Taken together, tracing the development of the political conflict 
around Tazartché highlights the inextricable mixture of ideological and 
material exploitation in politics. First, it becomes apparent that the op-
position forces – as in previous institutional breakdowns after the emer-
gence of multiparty politics in Niger – formed a united “democracy 
movement” against the government when their political positions and 
shares of state revenues were in danger. Second, the tangible aspects of 
politics are coupled with the strategic manoeuvres of signification. In this 
case, oil was signified either as the achievement and future task of a glori-
ous Nigerien statesman, or as the curse that transforms a democratic 
president into a dictator. Thus, signifying oil as curse or blessing became 
one of the very political acts through which the struggle for state power 
and legitimacy was waged.  
The following case study of the oil refinery’s inauguration demon-
strates the successive phases of a “political drama”: from the mobilisa-
tion of political capital, to a showdown, to a crisis, to mechanisms of 
redress, and then to the restoration of peace (Swartz, Turner, and Tuden 
1966). The phases of development will help us identify the mechanisms 
and logics of Nigerien politics in times of oil, and show how significa-
tions of resource wealth and development, including the resource-curse 
scenario itself, became part of the everyday micropolitical game. 
Crude Mobilisation: The Oil Refinery’s
Inauguration Ceremony 
While the oil refinery’s 2008 foundation-stone ceremony in Zinder was 
used as the starting signal for Tazartché, the refinery’s inauguration cere-
mony on 28 November 2011, celebrating the first day of production, 
became the theatre in which political conflicts between the new govern-
ment (PNDS-Tarayya and MODEN-FA Lumana) and the new opposi-
                                                 
12 After Hama Amadou dropped out of the Issoufou government in 2013 and 
thereafter became Issoufou’s main rival, Ali Idrissa turned into one of the most 
prominent public critics of the Issoufou regime. As a result, he was arrested 
several times in 2014, 2017, and 2018.  
  Oil, Power, and Politics in Niger 77
 

 
tion (CDS-Rahama and MNSD-Nassara) played out. Whereas Tandja 
was celebrated as the “father of oil production” in Niger at the founda-
tion-stone ceremony and was especially lauded for his choice of Zinder 
as the site of the refinery, Issoufou’s arrival three years later was accom-
panied by violent youth protests.  
Several weeks before the opening ceremony, political opponents 
began stirring up public opposition to Issoufou’s new government. First, 
regional and municipal councillors (most of them from the opposition 
CDS-Rahama or MNSD-Nassara parties)13 released a press statement 
about the risk of a social explosion at the oil refinery’s imminent inaugu-
ration. According to the councillors, public anger about the refinery was 
high, especially among male-dominated youth gangs called palais, which 
had sprung up in the context of growing unemployment and had a no-
torious criminal reputation in Zinder. Anger had increased with the 
nomination of the nine directors of the Societé de la Raffinerie à Zinder 
(Society of the Zinder Refinery, SORAZ), none of whom was from the 
Zinder region. Moreover, with the future creation of over 300 jobs at 
SORAZ, the regional and municipal councillors feared that local people 
would be locked out of opportunities at the refinery with the jobs going 
to western Nigeriens and Zarma people, and thus that the social equilib-
rium of Zinder was in danger. Subsequently, the councillors publicly 
installed a committee to ostensibly monitor the recruitment process. 
In the ensuing days, the civil society association Mouvement Popu-
laire pour la Pérennisation des Actions du Développement (MPPAD) 
released a statement celebrating Tandja as the “father of oil production 
in Niger” and accusing the newly elected government authorities of bad 
governance and marginalising the region of Zinder in respect to possible 
oil benefits. According to the MPPAD, Issoufou and the PNDS were so 
disconnected from reality and lacking in pragmatism that they had once 
commented on Tandja’s oil project with the words “everything is false, 
there is no drop of oil, there is only water.” Moreover, the statement 
harshly rejected the recruitment process in filling leading positions at 
SORAZ, which it judged “sectarian,” “ethnic,” and “politically motivat-
                                                 
13 The town council of Zinder was installed in June 2011 by universal suffrage 
and is composed of 23 councillors. Five political parties are represented on the 
council: CDS (14 seats); MNSD (4); PNDS (2); ARD (2); and Lumana (1). The 
regional council was also installed in June 2011 by universal suffrage and is 
made up of 41 elected councillors, 8 administrative chiefs (“traditional authori-
ties”), and 20 deputies. Seven political parties are represented on the council: 
CDS (12); PNDS (9); MNSD (8); ARD (5); Lumana (3); RPD (2); and RSD (2). 
The results show the dominance of CDS (and MNSD) in Zinder. 
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ed,” and demanded the oil minister recall the appointees. The statement 
ended with the MPPAD calling on the population to mobilise against the 
new government. The president of the MPPAD was Dan Dubai,14 a 
wealthy businessman and a main initiator and supporter of Tazartché. In 
supporting Tazartché, Dan Dubai hoped to secure a foothold in the 
government of Tandja and/or in the oil-transport business to come. He 
organised urban youth into so-called comités de defense in every quarter of 
Zinder. The leader of each group was given direct orders by the 
MPPAD, which he was to pass down to his subordinates. 
When the oil and energy minister Foumokoye Gado announced the 
future official Nigerien fuel price would be XOF 579 per litre (USD 
1.19)15 in a press conference two weeks before the oil refinery’s inaugur-
ation ceremony, a new wave of texting spread rapidly among the youth 
of Zinder. Short messages in Hausa and French calling on the popula-
tion to resist and fight the government were initially sent from unregis-
tered SIM cards. Several days before the inauguration, messages called 
on the population to boycott President Issoufou’s arrival in Zinder. Al-
though the police failed to track the source of these chain messages, it 
was obvious that some messages were strategically placed by political 
opponents – especially as the messages’ contents were nearly identical to 
those opponents’ declarations. 
One week prior to the inauguration, one of several similar debates 
was organised by a local radio station about the future prospects of the 
Zinder oil refinery. The debate featured a government representative, an 
opposition representative, and Dan Dubai. Dan Dubai listed the negative 
effects (pollution, poor working conditions) of oil production in Zinder 
and repeated accusations against the government of poor governance 
and marginalising the region of Zinder. The opposition representative 
spoke of the potential role of oil-led development in reducing youth 
unemployment, expressing equal concern about regional marginalisation 
in the distribution of jobs at the refinery. The government representative 
in turn argued that skills, knowledge, and competency and not the candi-
dates’ origin were the criteria used to fill positions at SORAZ, accusing 
the political opposition itself of ethnocentrism and regionalism. Explicit-
ly using the French term “malediction” (curse), he demanded the popula-
tion calm down and give oil production a chance to turn into a blessing. 
                                                 
14 Dan Dubai is Hausa and means “Son of Dubai.” 
15 Although this was a reduction from the former fuel price, which was about 
XOF 670/liter (USD 1.23), it was well above the XOF 250/liter (USD 0.51) 
maximum that Zinder’s political and social actors were demanding. 
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In doing so, he implicitly accused the political opposition and civil socie-
ty of being responsible should the “curse” actually become reality.  
Just days before the inauguration ceremony, several labour unions 
and associations – most of which had supported Tazartché – confederat-
ed as the Comité Régional des Associations et Syndicats de la Région de 
Zinder (CRAS). However, CRAS did not include all of the important 
civil society associations in Zinder, with several others working closely 
with the government, such as ROTAB, or trying to stay neutral, such as 
GREN. While members of ROTAB and GREN from Zinder had 
stressed the good relationship between civil society and government 
authorities in interviews and informal conversations, CRAS as a body 
instead heavily criticised the government for failing to deliver oil-induced 
development: infrastructure projects, a low fuel price, a regional quota 
for oil workers, health services, and better access to water and education. 
CRAS accused the government of being corrupt and incompetent, de-
nouncing politics in Niger as based on ethnic and political loyalty. More-
over, in a radio debate broadcast by Zinder radio station Alternative on 
15 November 2011, they accused the government of working with civil 
society organisations who would “eat, drink, applaud, and disperse after-
wards” and thus give their blessing to everything the government pro-
posed. Finally, the committee claimed the government must not only 
deal with these grievances, but also accept CRAS as a member of region-
al government committees created to supervise the recruitment process, 
organise the inauguration ceremony, and determine the fuel price. 
Here, it is important to note that members of a regional govern-
ment committee receive food, drinks, and daily allowances, making such 
positions highly sought-after by members of low- and middle-income 
groups facing pressing demands for financial redistribution within their 
social networks. Indeed, by voicing popular grievances, the opposition 
civil society associations in CRAS saw an opportunity to reclaim the 
political posts they had lost in the regime change. In order to deliver 
their list of concerns and demands, CRAS also lobbied for an audience 
with President Issoufou when he arrived for the inauguration. Here 
again, it is important to note that audiences with important government 
officials are widely believed to be occasions where envelopes of money 
are handed over. The refinery’s inauguration thus presented a perfect 
stage for CRAS to re-enter the public political sphere after regime 
change had excluded them from the political game and its financial 
flows. 
In the formative moment of Niger becoming a new oil producer, it 
has become evident that the first step in the mobilisation of political 
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capital and support was the appropriation of the current and sensitive 
subject of oil by all political players. Each player signified oil in particular 
ways to make claims to political power and legitimacy. However, al-
though the conflict played out around the inauguration ceremony, the 
political constellation had historical roots. The people of Zinder had 
always felt marginalised by Niamey politics; with the regime change from 
Tandja to Issoufou, Zinder had become the electoral stronghold of the 
opposition, which, in turn, tried to exploit the event of Niger becoming 
an oil producer for its political projects. We therefore argue that oil did 
not completely restructure political constellations in oil-age Niger, but 
fuelled pre-existing political conflicts. The refinery’s inaugural ceremony, 
in fact, became the stage upon which these conflicts played out.  
Crude Action: The Production of Disorder in 
Zinder
Three days prior to the refinery’s inauguration, Dan Dubai was arrested 
and accused of defaming the president in the aforementioned radio de-
bate. Following his arrest, he was increasingly portrayed by civil society 
activists and in text messages as a folk hero who dared to speak the truth 
in the name of the poor. 
On 28 November 2011, the President Issoufou arrived at Zinder 
International Airport for the refinery’s inauguration. In his speech at the 
opening ceremony, Nigerien oil and energy minister Gado stressed that 
Niger’s entrance into the circle of oil producers was a historic moment, 
and praised the Chinese for their determination to complete the oil pro-
ject. He then turned to oil revenues, their paradoxical effects, and the 
threats that they may pose – intensifying inequality, engendering frustra-
tion, and even stoking civil war. He argued that these threats had already 
started to develop – a reference to Tandja’s Tazartché campaign for 
constitutional change. He highlighted the importance of good govern-
ance and transparency in the resource sector in order to avoid these 
pitfalls and for the whole population to profit from the oil, and pointed 
to the fact that his government had complied with EITI criteria.  
However, while Issoufou’s arrival had been planned as a huge cele-
bration to usher in a new era of oil, it soon turned into a highly contested 
event. Supporters of the political opposition tried to disturb Issoufou’s 
official arrival by shouting, insulting him, and throwing stones. Near the 
bus station in the city centre, youths burnt tyres and fought with security 
forces. In chain text messages, the disturbance to Issoufou’s arrival was 
portrayed as a major success for the resistance. 
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In the days following Dan Dubai’s arrest, public debate was domi-
nated by his imprisonment. In press statements and radio debates, civil 
society associations demanded his release, while text messages called on 
the public to attend the court case, which was set for 6 December at the 
Zinder Tribunal. That day, several hundred mostly male youths gathered 
in front of the court. When the security forces started to drive the crowd 
into the streets, the ensuing clashes resulted in the death of a young 
student. The death caused public uproar. Over the following two days, 
youths attacked police stations, built and set alight street barricades of 
tyres, looted a bank, and burned down a police station. The unrest, 
which resulted in another death, was finally calmed when the military 
was deployed to regain control over the city.  
Taken together, significations of oil including the notion of a re-
source curse or blessing have become striking elements of rhetoric in the 
“crude moves” of Nigerien multiparty politics. While opponents accuse 
the government of making the “curse” a reality, government supporters 
use the beginning of oil production to accuse opponents of producing 
the “curse.” The formative moment of the oil project in Niger thus of-
fered political players new resources and opportunities to voice griev-
ances, build alliances, gain negotiating power, find recognition as an 
interest group, compete for position and a share of state revenues, and 
formulate visions of the future and thereby (re)claim political power and 
legitimacy. These strategic manoeuvres of signification were coupled 
with tangible manoeuvres of manipulating youth violence or trying to 
seek a profitable cohabitation with the government. Here, what may 
have initially appeared to be “politics from below” were, in fact, also 
“politics from above,” with at least some of the text messages designed 
by influential political players to mobilise the population against the 
government.   
Crude Order(ing): Redressive Politics and the 
Restoration of Peace 
After the riots, the government responded with the temporary shutdown 
of the entire SMS network in Zinder. It also used state radio and tele-
vision, the Office de Radiodiffusion et Télévision du Niger, to announce 
initial measures, including the dismissal of executive police officers and 
the convening of a commission to uncover the masterminds of the riots. 
On 8 December 2011, the prime minister was sent to Zinder to meet 
with the sultan, the governor, and religious authorities, as well as teacher, 
parent, and student representatives. After the meeting at the sultanate, a 
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joint statement appealing for calm was released. Following the appeal, 
the situation in Zinder remained calm but tense. While it became public 
that the prime minister had distributed money at the meeting, there was 
no public criticism of the fact that the government had bought off the 
different representatives to subdue the tensions.16 
However, several actors were not included in the meeting. First, 
CRAS was disappointed they had not been invited. CRAS members had 
neither been granted an audience with the president at the refinery’s 
inauguration, nor been appointed to regional government committees. 
Thus, in the following months CRAS continued to sharply criticise the 
government, culminating in planning a mass demonstration set for 
March 2012. Shortly before the demonstration was to take place, two of 
the committee’s most influential members said they had received infor-
mation that opposition politicians planned to hijack the demonstration 
by distributing tyres and fuel to encourage youth gangs. When CRAS 
indeed decided to cancel the demonstration, another CRAS member 
claimed to have proof that those who had pushed for the cancellation of 
the demonstration had been paid off by a wealthy businessman on behalf 
of the governor. Debate among CRAS members following the accusa-
tions did not focus on “the fact” their comrades had accepted bribes 
from state officials, but rather that the accused did not share the money 
with the other members. One committee member, for example, ex-
pressed his disappointment that the accused lacked solidarity and re-
ferred to their former support for Tazartché. The committee member 
said he had always shared contributions from the Tandja government 
equally among the other group members. Indeed, CRAS stopped func-
tioning after the accusations. 
Second, having been at the forefront of the December 2011 riots, 
disaffected male youth of Zinder gained political leverage and became 
addressees of government policies. The Mouvement des Fadas et Palais 
pour la Promotion de la Jeunesse (Movement of Fadas and Palais for the 
Promotion of Youth, MFPPJ) was established between May and June 
2012 on the initiative of local political authorities from the government 
and the sultan. Shortly afterwards, the MFPPJ declared its support for 
the government and President Issoufou. In a public letter addressed to 
Dan Dubai and distributed to Niger’s presidency and Zinder’s various 
                                                 
16 The distribution money became public due to an internal conflict within the 
student union (USN) about how to distribute it amongst themselves. USN 
members reported that the religious authorities and the parent–teacher associa-
tion each received XOF 1 million (USD 2,056) while the USN received XOF 
300,000 (USD 617). 
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political authorities, they dissociated themselves from the MPPAD and 
blamed Dan Dubai for organising “anarchist, unilateral, and politically 
connotated demonstrations.” When President Issoufou came to Zinder a 
second time for the foundation-stone ceremony of the Zinder–Guidi-
mouni road on 15 May 2012, a huge audience joyously received him. 
Indeed, the crowd was said to have been even larger than that for 
Tandja’s 2008 foundation-stone/Tazartché-launch ceremony. Following 
Issoufou’s visit, a conflict within the MFPPJ erupted over the contribu-
tions it had received from the government (which, aside from monetary 
contributions, also apparently included an Opel car and free fuel), result-
ing in a leadership split that left the MFPPJ inoperative. 
The cases of the MFPPJ, CRAS, and the prime minister’s visit show 
that there seems to be a socially embedded “moral economy of corrup-
tion” (Olivier de Sardan 1999) in Niger, with the logic of the political 
game inextricably entangled with social logics to redistribute spoils of the 
game within social networks. Moreover, the course of events illustrates 
how civil society associations were able to establish themselves as polit-
ical players in a multiparty system through their ability to act as counter-
powers to the government. The ruling party coalition must appease or 
repress opposition groups by employing political manoeuvres such as 
bribery, co-option, intimidation, or political arrest. As the course of 
events furthermore shows, with over 75 per cent of the Nigerien popula-
tion under 25 years of age and given the potential for violence among 
youth gangs (in Zinder in particular), disaffected male youths have be-
come targets of both government and opposition mobilisation politics. 
In this instance, in order to avoid riots and other uprisings, the govern-
ment addressed the youth by creating formal, structured groups that it 
could negotiate with and govern more easily.  
As in the case of “big” politics and power struggles at the national 
level, this case study demonstrates that the coming of oil does not auto-
matically determine the constellations of power and the outcomes of 
political confrontations on a local political arena. Rather, oil flows into 
an already well-established political arena in which a mixture of significa-
tory and tangible manoeuvres gives the existing political games a new, 
discernible stimulus. 
Conclusion 
Using Niger’s entrance into the oil age as a lens through which to analyse 
political dynamics, our case study provides insights into both the inner 
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workings of Nigerien politics and the discursive relevance of oil in the 
formative moment of the country becoming a new oil producer.  
First, we illustrated how oil entered an already well-structured polit-
ical arena in which pre-existing political conflicts were expressed in oil 
language. With political liberalisation and the emergence of a multiparty 
system in Niger in the early 1990s, the rules of the game were trans-
formed from authoritarian silence to a formally defined system to allow 
for political competition, free press, and civil society activism. It is within 
this political context that oil production in Niger began. Long before the 
first barrel could be extracted, different strategic groups politically ex-
ploited oil. Tandja’s attempt to change the Constitution was legitimised 
with the oil project, but its origins were related to a political conflict 
dating back to at least 2004, when he and Prime Minister Hama Amadou 
began fighting for control within the MNSD-Nassara party. Instead of 
simply following the logic of the resource-curse thesis and assuming, as 
long-time political observers of Niger have done, that oil was the root 
cause of the authoritarian project Tazartché, it seems more appropriate 
to understand the events as part of a broader complex of ongoing power 
struggles. In these power struggles, the resource-curse scenario has itself 
become a piece of political rhetoric for various players in Niger.  
Second, oil was not the root cause for the disorder during the oil re-
finery’s 2011 inauguration. Rather, the ceremony became the stage upon 
which pre-existing conflicts related to Zinder’s historical marginalisation 
and the politics of Tazartché played out. Next to the fact that the regime 
change from Tandja to Issoufou turned Zinder into the stronghold of 
the political opposition, the location of Zinder as the site of the oil re-
finery played an important role in the production of disorder around the 
opening ceremony. When oil came to Zinder, it was quickly appropriated 
by various strategic groups who put it to use in the political games they 
had already been playing. We saw, for example, how Dan Dubai and the 
civil society associations that had supported Tazartché were left empty-
handed after the regime change. These actors tried to use the inaugura-
tion as a public stage to build new alliances, gain negotiating power, find 
recognition as an interest group, and thus re-engage with the political 
game. Moreover, urban youth gained public and political presence 
through violent performances and were consequently co-opted into the 
political projects of more powerful players.   
In this sense, the formative moment of Niger entering the oil age 
opened a window onto the inner workings of Nigerien politics. Our case 
study revealed the importance of a combination of factors in explaining 
contemporary Nigerien political dynamics. It is the system of multiparty 
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politics, private media, and civil society activism in combination with a 
moral economy of corruption that favours spoils of the political game 
over political ideology. In this game, increasing male youth unemploy-
ment and violence can be mobilised and manipulated by various political 
players to pursue their political projects. However, these dynamics pre-
dated oil production in Niger and should, therefore, not be confused 
with oil-induced transformations.    
Comparing the case of Niger with oil politics in neighbouring coun-
tries, we see how the significations of oil differ in their temporal dimen-
sions, dependent on the “phases of oil development” (Heilbrunn 2014: 
110–144). We view five broad phases of oil production as being of par-
ticular importance. First, there is the “state of not-yet-ness” (Witte 2017), 
when the government and at least parts of the population are aware that 
oil exploration has begun, but production has not yet started. Weszkal-
nys (2014) in São Tomé and Príncipe, Witte (2017) in Uganda, and Beh-
rends (2008) in Chad have analysed how the absence or not-yet-ness of 
oil production spurred all kinds of anticipatory practices and economies 
of expectation, and thus materialised and affected the country although 
the oil was still in the ground. The second phase is that of a country as 
an emergent oil producer, where oil production is just about to com-
mence, or has just commenced. We showed that Niger in 2011/2012 was 
characterised by oil’s immediate presence, with oil acting as an idiom that 
framed political conflicts in its language. However, with recurrent pro-
tests around various events in Niger, after several months or years of 
production, oil’s discursive presence has diminished over time, and polit-
ical debates have increasingly turned towards other issues (Schritt 2015). 
The third phase is that of a mature oil producer such as Nigeria, where 
production started decades ago and patterns to manage and absorb oil 
revenues have become well established. In this advanced stage of pro-
duction, oil seems to lose its early significance in public discourse, never-
theless continuing to profoundly shape political configurations; this has 
been demonstrated in Nigeria (Watts 2004), where it has trickled down 
into everyday life, becoming expressed in all kinds of illicit behaviour 
(Apter 2005). Fourth, there is the phase of declining production, as in 
Gabon or Oman, where hydrocarbons decrease and oil revenues start to 
fall. In this late stage of production, oil appears to again become discur-
sively pertinent, with a (perceived) end to production looming. In Oman, 
for example, this has spurred new discussions about a future without oil 
(Limbert 2010); in Gabon, the continuous depletion of oil has produced 
new uncertainties among the population (Fricke 2017). Fifth, we can 
imagine a post-oil phase, in which production has ceased and oil might 
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be (actively) remembered or forgotten. However, we should not concep-
tualise these phases too neatly, or view them as being self-contained. Oil 
production can periodically become an issue that sparks public politics, 
especially in relation to broader international events, such as a price 
boom or crash.  
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Zähes Ringen: Öl, Macht und Politik in Niger 
 
Zusammenfassung: In diesem Artikel analysieren wir die politischen 
und sozialen Prozesse, die das westafrikanische Land Niger seit dem Jahr 
2008 zu einem neuen Erdölstaat gemacht haben. Die Förderung von 
Erdöl hat zwar nicht das Szenario eines „Ressourcenfluchs“ ausgelöst, 
aber sie ist durchaus zu einem wesentlichen Faktor in der aktuellen poli-
tischen Situation des Landes geworden. Die Analyse der politischen 
Praxis und ihrer Narrative im Ölstaat Niger zeigt, wie unterschiedliche 
Akteure, darunter die Regierung, politische Parteien, die Zivilgesellschaft 
und Geschäftsleute, das Erdöl in eine politische Ressource verwandeln, 
indem sie ihm bestimmte Bilder und Bedeutungen, zu denen u.a. die 
Szenarien eines Fluchs oder Segens gehören, zuordnen. Wir zeigen, dass 
im Moment der Genese des Ölstaates Niger das Erdöl zu einem Idiom 
wird, in dem aktuelle politische und soziale Prozesse des Landes verhan-
delt werden. 
 
Schlagwörter: Niger, Erdöl, Politik, Staat, Ressourcenfluch, Signifizie-
rung, Zeitlichkeit 
 
 
